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Security Information26 September 1952  
(Appnd. date)Document No. 2MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training NO CHANGE in Class, ☐

SUBJECT: Current Status of TR(S) DECLASSIFIED

Class. CHANGED TO: TS S (C)

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Date: 14 MAR 1978

I. MISSION

A. Office of Training (Special) is charged with the training conducted in the United States which supports the clandestine services of CIA and which, for operational security reasons, cannot be accomplished by other means. Performance of this mission involves three primary tasks, which are fundamental to all TR(S) activity:

1. To develop in the individual trainee those attitudes and disciplines with respect to security and human relationships which are peculiar to and inherent in all clandestine operations;
2. To provide him with the specific skills and technical abilities which will be required for the successful performance of his particular assigned duties;
3. To make available to him that operationally significant background knowledge which is essential to his understanding of the covert mission of CIA and of his place and function within it.

II. DISCUSSION

A. TR(S) has recognized from the outset that, given the progressive development of the Agency and the objective of establishing a professional career service, the training problem can, at no time, be static. In any analysis of the problem, it rapidly emerges that there are, in fact, two problems:

1. To satisfy, insofar as existing capabilities and assets permit, the immediate training requirements of a rapidly-expanding Agency;
2. To develop simultaneously and as a fundamental responsibility a long-range training program which will be responsive to increasingly complex and diversified operational requirements.

B. In seeking a solution to this dual problem, TR(S) has attempted three things:

1. The creation of

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1. The creation of a basic organizational structure sufficiently flexible to permit the presentation of a current emergency program, and at the same time to be capable of absorbing new requirements and severe modification of current requirements without the need for frequent, time-consuming reorganizations;

2. The presentation of what must be considered an emergency training program to service the current, abnormally heavy training requirement which has resulted from the rapid expansion of the clandestine services;

3. The concurrent preparation of more highly specialized training materials covering fields where there already exists a small, but significant, requirement, or where it is believed that requirements will inevitably develop in the foreseeable future. Experience to date has shown that, to collect, organize, and authenticate an acceptable two-week unit of instruction in a specialized operational field, has required between eight months and a year.

### III. CONDITIONING FACTORS

A. In undertaking to construct a training program to meet the current requirements of the clandestine offices under DD/P, it has been necessary to take into consideration a variety of factors stemming from the abnormal rate of growth of the operating offices during the past eighteen months. These factors, taken collectively, create a series of problems which can be solved only by an exceedingly flexible pattern of training as described under "Status of TR(S)" below. Taken individually, they are:

1. Time Available for Training. The operating offices, being themselves under heavy pressure to fill out their personnel requirements both at headquarters and in the field, have, in turn, maintained a constant pressure on TR(S) to accomplish the training of new employees in the minimal possible time. This urgency of need for personnel has resulted, in many instances, in trainees receiving either no training at all, or only a portion of the training appropriate to their projected assignments;

2. Variety of Trainees. Personnel trained by TR(S) during the last eighteen months have ranged from very junior personnel just out of college to mature individuals with extensive academic and professional experience in fields other than clandestine operations. While the great majority have had no prior clandestine intelligence experience, a certain number have, in the

past, worked in

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past, worked in related fields;

3. Variety of Projected Assignments. Prior to the establishment of OPC, the TR(S) function supported only the espionage and counterespionage missions of OSO. Today, there are included,




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Paralleling these substantive variations are the equally important variations in level of assignment. Whereas, prior to Korea, the great majority of new employees were at the junior level, the current classes range in projected assignment all the way from junior clerical and operational personnel to station chiefs and persons destined for senior staff positions, with resulting requirements for varying levels of instruction.

4. Variety of Area of Assignment. Since the projected assignments of each student group are widely scattered geographically, training content must consider the extensive variations in operating conditions which the individual students will encounter. This is particularly true in the operational programs where not only must principles be taught, but their application must be illustrated in terms of varying geographic and operational factors, if the instruction is to be valid.

#### IV. STATUS OF TRAINING (SPECIAL)



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